

Chapter 3

Universal as Conceptual Reality

The cardinal issue raised in all discussion concerning universals is *whether Universals really exist?* We have seen in the previous chapter that, according to realist, universal exists in realist sense, that is, they exist externally as a given reality. In this chapter we propose to examine *whether universals exist in nominalist sense?* Nominalism is like the proverbial bird, the more it dies, the more vigorously it lives. It is based on two fundamental positions: (1) that what exists, is eventual and sensational and (2) that names of universal are signs without anything to refer to. Here we are concerned especially with Buddhist nominalism as presented by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattovasamgraha*. The Buddhist advances a penetrating criticism of realist position and defends his nominalism by active logic. He approaches the problem of universals from the standpoint of absolute difference. According to Śāntarakṣita, realist theory of universal has no essence in it; it is an elaboration of a mere theory or process and nothing more than that. Moreover, there is no evidence

(*pramāṇa*) at all in support of it. If there is no means of evidence about universal¹, then there is no universal. Now in order to understand Śāntarakṣita's criticism of realism, it is imperative to understand first the chief tenets of Buddhist nominalism which Śāntarakṣita propounded and used as a tool to refute realism of Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā type.

Chief Tenets of Buddhist Nominalism

- I. *Particulars alone are real*: The Buddhist's maintain that particulars alone exist, they alone are revealed in sense-perception qua individuals, and all the particulars are different from one another. Particulars are of two types (1) *events* - which are the only cognitive and ultimately irreducible contents and in themselves beyond reference (*anirdeśya*), unthinkable (*acintya*) and inexpressible (*anabhilāpya*), and (2) *continuants* which are the things that persist through at least some interval of time and that are capable of undergoing change while remaining the same thing as before and which are derived from the flow of such events. They are conventional particulars.²


- II. *Universal is a Concept*: The term '*concept*' is used in a wide variety of senses both in daily life and in Philosophical reflection. In philosophy three interpretations stand out:³
 - (a) Firstly, the '*concept*' is the reference of the logical predicate term.

- (b) Secondly, the traditional view, that the 'concept' is whatever is before the mind excepting only all particulars perceived and all memory images of particulars as particulars.
- (c) And thirdly, the 'concept' is presented not as an object before the mind, these are to be thought but in themselves they are part of the thinking capacity, a disposition or possibly an attitude.

In Buddhist Nominalism, a 'concept'⁴ is a mental thought, subjective construction, thought construction, and a mere name having no objective foundation whatsoever (ontological status), because according to them only *svalakṣaṇa* is real, whereas concept (or universal) is a product of *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa*, therefore unreal and has only nominal existence.

III. *Reality is Momentary, Unutterable and Ineffable*: Reality, according to Buddhist, is constituted of momentary particulars, which are absolutely discrete and disparate. There is no identity and similarity in reality. All notion of identity and similarity, therefore are fancies of imagination. There is no recurrence in reality, for the momentary character constituting it is non-repetitive. The Buddhist tries to establish his nominalism on a secure foundation by distinguishing between two orders of Reality: (1) the Ultimate (*paramārtha*) - is the world of unique point instants (*svalakṣaṇa* or specifically characterized phenomena or events) which are given in pure sensation and (2)


the Empirical (*saṃvṛti*) - is the world of universals (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa* or generally characterized phenomena or continuants) which are given by understanding. Thought and language are concerned with the latter and not with the former.⁵



Moreover, we can never apprehend the reality as such (thing-in-themselves) because it is in flux. It is inexpressible, that is beyond thought and language. Nevertheless, conceptual knowledge is not absolutely valueless; it has practical value, though ultimately it is illusory. Reality, cannot be known, grasped 'as it is' (*tathatā*) as such in our perception.

Because, the fact that both the object and consciousness, while reflecting the object, have passed perpetual transformations which make it impossible for the object to be known 'as it is'. For this reason

all that is available is a concept (mere representation of consciousness, i.e. *Vijñaptimātra*) and not an ultimate reality.⁶ Actually what happened can be explained by the following diagram, originally illustrated by H.S. Prasad, which I am only paraphrasing here⁷.



In the first step the cognizer (c) confronts an external object (o), which is constantly emanating data. In the second step, these data stimulate the cognizer's sense (s) and get transformed and structured as object o^1 in his philosophical, neurological and psychological process. The cognizer is only aware o^1 which is actually unconsciously constructed inside his body system and projected outside. Because of the inherent nature of intentionality, this awareness/consciousness falsely splits itself as subject and object. What is input to him is never known by him. He knows only what is output by his mind. The problem is that he doesn't know this output as output, but as input as shown in third step. Note that the original input is only in step first about which the cognizer is unaware. The

diagram shows that the cognizer takes the third step as the first one. He is totally unaware of the first and second step.

IV. *Difference between Universal and Particular*

- (1) The particular has causal efficiency while the universal doesn't.⁸
- (2) The particular is different, while the universal is identical.⁹
- (3) The particular is indeterminate, while the universal is determinate.
- (4) The cognition of the particular depends solely on the particular, while that of the universal depends on mental activity in the form of comparison, recollection of the conventional name etc.
- (5) And lastly, subjective activity is necessary for the cognition of the universal, while it is not only unnecessary, but also contrary to the cognition of the particular.¹⁰

In this way, Buddhist distinguishes the particulars i.e. specifically characterized phenomena through four criteria¹¹:

- (1) Having the power to produce effect (*arthakriyā-śakti*)
- (2) Being specific, discrete and disparate, i.e. individual (*asadrśa*)
- (3) Not directly denotable by language (*śabdasyaviśaya*)

- (4) Apprehensible without reliance on other factors (*nimitta*) such as language and conceptuality.

V. *Universal has Nominal Existence*

Buddhist gives an argument:

- (1) All that, which is conventionally assumed to exist, has only nominal existence.
- (2) Universals are the product of conventional conception.
- (3) Therefore, universals have nominal existence.

Further, nominal essence differs fundamentally from the real essence, for it is not discovered by the mind but made by it.

VI. *Idea of Unity/Identity*

It is perfectly explainable without assuming the existence of the universal outside the mind. The particular causally efficient things may themselves be regarded as the basis of the notion of unity. But, now the question is - "*without a comprehensive something, how can mutually distinct entities become the basis, directly or indirectly of the notion of identity or unity?*"

Buddhist answers this question on the basis of certain analogies. Dharmakīrti, gives the example of colour cognition to show how different things produce an identical effect. The cognition

of colour, even according to the realist, involves four factors i.e. the object (colour), light, the organ of vision and the cognizing mind. These factors have nothing in common and yet they contribute towards the production of an identical effect.¹² i.e. colour cognition. Similarly different particulars having nothing in common may be supposed to produce an identical cognition.

Śāntarakṣita also answers this question in the *Tatvasaṃgraha* in the *Kārikās* 722-725, by giving the example of *dhātri*, *harītakī*, etc., in the following manner.¹³

Dhātri and some other fruits are admittedly different from one another, yet they are found in experience to possess a common efficiency. It cannot be supposed that they are informed and enlivened by a permanent universal, which exercised this common efficiency, because in that case, the efficiency would be absolutely invariable and identical in respect of time and magnitude. But this is not the case, one is seen to afford speedy relief, another to be sluggish in operation and the magnitude of efficiency also is seen to be variable in different substances. Nor can it be right to assert that the said universal itself performs the diverse fruitful acts, when it acquires certain peculiar properties through the diversities of the soil etc., because it remains always one and the same form. Thus, though, as a rule, things are entirely different, yet some of them having well-defined potencies are conceived of as similar and hence these things

become the basis of the conception of similarity etc. and not other things.

VII. *Identity is merely apparent*

Buddhist denies identity on both the sides; there is real identity neither of causes, nor of effects. In the above example of medicines given in *Tattavasamgraha*, Buddhist denies that the causal efficiency of the different medicines is identical. Some are more effective independently while others act only when mixed with some other materials. These diverse causal efficiencies cannot be regarded as determined by an identical nature. Similarly the effects (cures) produced by these medicines are not identical vary in the degree of efficacy and duration. Thus the cognition of identity is illusory. The apparent temporal continuity of an entity is but made up of discrete moments, just as the continuity of the cinematographic pictures is illusory composed as it is of swiftly moving successive snapshots. According to Buddhist things are not same but only similar and because of '*bhedāgraha*' (non-apprehension of difference) we are not able to distinguish between them. But, according to non-Buddhist it is '*abhedāgraha*' (apprehension of non-difference) as they are identical due to the presence of universal.

VIII. *Universal is not a Percept, but a thought construct*

Of the two forms of perception admitted by the Naiyāyika, the Buddhist recognizes only the indeterminate one (*nirvikalpa*) as valid and pure-perception i.e. bare sensation in which the absolutely

unrelated particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) is given, and it is absolutely free from all forms of mental activity, while the determinate (*savikalpa*) is not a genuine perception, since it involves conception. And the universal is an object of conception and not of perception. But, now the question is - What is Perception?

In order to answer this question, we have to consider four definitions given by Buddhist thinkers:

Dignāga's Definition of Perception¹⁴

"pratyakṣam kalpanā 'poḍham"

According to Dignaga Perception is a cognition, which is free from conceptual construction.


Dharmakīrti's Definition of Perception¹⁵

"tatra kalpanāpoḍhamabhrāntam pratyakṣam"

According to Dharmakīrti, Perception has been defined as a presentation, which is generated by the object alone, unassociated by any names or relation (*kalpanā*) and which is not erroneous (*abrānta*). Hence, a perception means neither construction (judgment) nor illusions (error).

Vasubandhu's Definition of Perception¹⁶

Perception is the reflective awareness that 'I have perception of such and such object' when the sense no longer has to be in contact with its object.



In Perception 2 moments occurs:

- (1) The moment of contact between the sense and the object (A in diagram)
- (2) The moment of reflection, where one realizes that one has the perception of something, when the sense no longer has to be in contact with its object (B in diagram). For Vasubandhu perception occurs at this second moment of reflection, when object is not seen at all because the eye-consciousness is obstructed at that time and perception is determined, only by thought-consciousness and moreover due to momentariness of both the object and sense-organ (subject) in the second moment of reflective awareness, when perception take place, there will be neither the same object nor the same sense-organ. Therefore,

perception cannot have for its object an extra-mental reality but just an image constructed by the mind.

Śāntarakṣita's Definition of Perception¹⁷

Śāntarakṣita explain the process of perception in the *Kārikā*-129¹⁷, where he states that first, every cognition appears in a form free from verbal expression (*nirvikalpa*), there is no convention bearing upon the specific peculiarity of things; and it is only after one has seen the entity, prior to its determination, there comes to the mind, the body of convention bearing upon that same entity (*savikalpa*), then there appears the notions of *sattā* and the rest (universal) in accordance with the said convention, in regard to the thing that has been seen, and these notions embody all the determination with reference to the thing and give verbal expressions to them (convention). In short the process is as follows:

First *Nirvikalpa*

Perception takes Place —→ Body of Convention —→ Role of Memory —→ Cognition of Existence —→ *Savikalpa* Perception

Thus, the universal never arises immediately after sense-object contact, but only after the present data of the senses are associated with those of the past and the conventional name is recollected. This is also proved by the fact that when the attention of a person is diverted elsewhere (absent minded), there is no conception inspite of the sense-cognition of the object.¹⁸

In this way, according to Buddhist universal is not perceived but conceived and its cognition is always indirect, mediated by subjective activity.

So far we have discussed chief tenets of Buddhist nominalism in order to understand his position. Now we have to discuss Buddhist attack on realism and under this, first we mention general criticism, then goes on to Śāntarakṣita special objections against realism given in his *Tattovasamgraha*.

General Objections against Realism

1. *Whether the whole of a universal or only a part of it is present in the individual?*

If the universal is wholly present in one individual then it is obvious that it cannot be present in other individuals, which defeats the purpose for which the universal was conceived. If it be contended that only part of the universal is present in an individual then it would follow that the universal is divisible and so perishable.

2. *Is the universal all-pervasive or is it confined to individual belonging to the same class or is it ubiquitous?*

If the universal is found in all objects, then the quality or being example cow, must be found in horses, stones etc. also. In that case there would be intermixture of classes and they would become indistinguishable from one another.

On the other hand, if the universal exists only in a special group of individuals, then how come it that we begin to perceive cowness in a newly born calf, since cowness didn't exist in that place before? Since the universal is held to be eternal, it cannot be maintained that the universal was born along with the individual cow. Nor can it be argued that the universal is transmitted to the new individual form some other individual being inactive.

If to avoid the difficulty the other alternative is accepted i.e. if the universal is regarded as a Ubiquitous entity, then its non-perception in empty space becomes unexplainable.

3. Can there be subsistence of universal in its particular?

Buddhist objection in connection with the subsistence of a universal are couched in the well known verses which says:

- (a) A universal does not moves from some where else to the place where its particular is born, in order to subsist there in, because the universals are motionless.
- (b) Nor was it already present there, because in that case, if the universal in question be *gotva*, that place would also appear as a cow on account of the subsistence of the universal cowness in that place.

- (c) Nor can the universal be regarded as born at that place at the time a particular is born, because a universal is regarded as eternal.
- (d) Not can the universal subsists in its particular by its part because it is partless.
- (e) Nor can it subsist in its parts in entirely because in that case it will have to subsist in a particular individual by leaving its former substratum, which would become devoid of the universal.

Therefore, whatever position the advocates of the universal may adopt, there will be an unending series of difficulties. In *Tattovasamgraha* also, Śāntarakṣita advances an argument against the very conception of the subsistence of universal, we will discuss that later on.

4. Is 'Gotva' (cowness) An Universal?

According to Buddhist there can be no universal like 'gotva', because it can subsist neither in a cow, nor in a non-cow. If it subsists in a cow, the cow in that case, is already a cow even without the subsistence of *gotva* in it. If you say, it should be in a non-cow, we repudiate it, because in that case a horse and others will also become a cow.

5. *If there are universals (as realist believes) then of course we need a language capable of talking about them?*

According to Buddhist there are two types of language, namely: Nominalist language and Realist language. But there is no need of accepting realist language over and above nominalist language in our discourse because nominalist language is sufficient and adequate for the statements of facts or definitions, which scientists and philosophers will want language to be rich enough to provide.¹⁹

Nominalist Language Contain four things

- (i) Customary logical notations.
- (ii) Names of individuals (particular term) and variables.
- (iii) Predicate-names (general term) may or may not
 - May - relational predicate - resemblance theory
 - May not - extreme nominalist
- (iv) May contains any further expressions, which are introduced by definition in terms of the foregoing.

Nominalist language doesn't contain

- (i) Universals
- (ii) Properties
- (iii) Relations
- (iv) Abstract terms (humanity)

Realist language contains

- (i) Names of non-individual
- (ii) The names of attribute (properties or qualities)
- (iii) Relations

Till now we have discussed general Buddhist criticism of Realism, now we will discuss criticism mentioned in the *Tattoasaṃgraha* by Śāntarakṣita one by one in detail in the form of issues.

Śāntarakṣita style of criticizing realist position is that, before he attacks on the universal, he attacks on the substance theory. Therefore, before mentioning his criticism against the realist concept of universal, we have to deal with its refutation of substance theory, given in the *Kārikā-707*, in his *Tattoasaṃgraha*.

dravyādiṣu nisiddheṣu jātayo 'pi nirakṛtaḥ /

padārthatrayavṛttā hi sarvāstaḥ parikalpitaḥ //

According to Naiyāyikas, 'universals' are held to be subsistent in three categories, namely - substance, quality and action. But, Buddhist rejected these three categories themselves, therefore the universal also have been rejected, as without the substratum (*ādhara*, *āśarya* i.e., *dravya*, *guṇa* & *karma*) the subsistent of universal cannot exist anywhere, for if it did, it would not be subsistent at all. In this

way, through the refutation of substratum, there is a refutation of universal.

Issues Concerning the Concept of Universal

1. *Whether universal arises immediately after the functioning of sense-organ or through convention?*

According to Buddhist, universal never arises immediately after sense-object contact, because it is of the nature of determinate cognition (*savikalpa*), the body of convention, bearing upon the verbal expression must interpose between the sense-operation and the resultant determinate cognition.²⁰ That is, the cognition of an entity and the functioning of the senses is intertwined by determinate perception and remembrance of convention.

2. *What is the basis of Naming Process?*

According to Buddhist, the makers of convention apply the term 'existent' on noticing a certain identity among things indicated by the fact of their performing similar functions (*ekavāyortyā*).²¹ In short it means - we call all individual cows as 'cow' because they perform similar function of differentiating cow from non-cow. That is, naming of the cow depends upon the convention which itself is based on the function performed by it. Moreover, naming is also affected according to one's own predilection (desire). Thus naming can be based on convention also, function also and desire also. Moreover, after the convention has been made, when people come to

use the term, even when the OX is seen the previous convention steps in and the same 'OX' comes to the mind; and the idea that it 'exists' comes only later in a clear form.²²

The whole matter is thus summed up from all this, it follows that naming process requires, two conditions, namely: (1) Incapacity to distinguish between the two object (e.g. cow) i.e. '*bhedāgraha*' and (2) Performing same function of differentiating, cow from non-cow, i.e. '*ekāvyaṛtyā*'.

3. *Is the negation of action, quality and name be the cause of the notion of non-existence?*

According to Buddhist, if we based the reality of *abhāva* on the absence of these three things, namely, action, quality and name, then it is not right, because if *abhāva* is real, then it must have some potency to postulate the absence as real, as the being of an entity is dependent on the potency of that entity. That is, what has been said to constitute the character of the cause is the potency to produce the effect and this potency can reside only in a positive entity. Moreover, if you don't admit this, then *sattā* etc. would appear like absence, as there in also is present the negation of action, quality and name, just as much as in such non-entities as the 'hare's horns'.²³

4. *Whether in the perception of 'Cow' only Universal cow is perceived and nothing else or its body, shape, colour etc. are also perceived?*

According to Naiyāyikas in the perception of 'cow' only universal cow is perceived and nothing else like its body, shape, colour etc.

and moreover, universal cow itself is devoid of all tinge of colour, shape etc. This however is not right because, the actual cognition that appears is always apprehended as accompanied by the manifestation of colour etc. How then could the basis of such cognition consist of what is devoid of colour etc.? Certainly a cognition of one form cannot have its basis in something of an entirely different form; if it did it would lead to absurdities.²⁴

5. *Is 'Universal Blue' identical or different from 'Quality Blue'?*

According to Śāṅkarasvāmin the universal blue is of the form of blue, if it were not so, then there would be no such comprehensive idea of blue. But, according to Śāntarakṣita, if such being the case, then there can be no difference between the 'quality blue' and the 'universal blue'. But there is a difference between the form of the two - the quality blue is not something comprehensive while the universal blue embraces all that is blue at all times and at all places.

6. *Is there any Padārthatva of Padārtha?*

According to Realist, there is no such universal as *padārthatva* (the genus category) subsisting in all the six categories, on the basis of which there should be such a comprehensive notion as 'this is a category' and so forth. Similarly, there is no universal being subsisting in the universal, the specific individuality and inherence, by virtue of which each of these could be conceived of as 'existing'. But, according to Śāntarakṣita, if these concepts can arise without

universals, then what justification is there for assuming universals in the case of other concepts such as, cow, man, and substance etc.²⁶

7. *Is there any universal in the cases like the Cook, the teacher, four kinds of negation, persons and things created by imagination and also in regard to dead and unborn persons?*

According to Buddhist, there is no ontological foundation or factual basis for these concepts, yet there is no difficulty in the matter of referring to different individuals by a common name and a common concept.²⁷

Now in order to understand this point, we have to discuss each of these concepts one by one in detail as presented by Śāntarakṣita in his *Tattvasaṃgraha*, in the form of arguments and objection.

Notion of Cook

(i) *According to Realist, 'the notion of cook' is due to the act of cooking (action).*

Objection

But, according to Śāntarakṣita this is not right because this action also is held to be different from each person, just like the individuality. Moreover, action say, for example 'cooking' being an accidental fact and so being discontinuance, a person would not be called a cook, when he does not actually perform the cooking operations. Neither can the past nor the future action responsible for

this conceptual thought, as they are simply non-existent. So no objective basis can be discovered for this conceptual thought and permanent nomenclature.²⁸

(ii) *According to Śaṅkarasvāmin, the individual actions may be variable, but the 'Universal of action' (kriyātoajāti) is imperishable and this becomes the ground of the class concept.*²⁹

Objection

According to Śāntarakṣita, when the particular action has ceased, the permanent 'universal' even though indicated, cannot really exist, because its 'receptacle' (locus) has ceased to exist, and when locus is not there, how can we perceive the universal of the action and when the universal is not present, how can that be the ground of that particular action.³⁰

(iii) *According to realist, when once the universal has been indicated and perceived, even if its receptacle, in the shape of the particular act, ceases, the idea based upon it still continues.*

Objection

But, according to Śāntarakṣita in the case of such universals as the 'stick' and the 'armlet' and the like, even though they have been indicated and perceived once, the idea of the man with the stick or man with the armlet does not continue, on the removal of the stick or armlet.³¹

(iv) *According to Uddyotakara, cook is called as such because of 'act of cooking' i.e. it is the chief instrumental/principle cause of cook and not the universal of act of cooking.*³²

Objection

But, according to Śāntarakṣita what is it that it called 'principle character'? If it means efficiency (*śakti*), it does not avail in the least, as efficiency is peculiar to each individual and does not continue. If it means the individuality (*svabhāva*) of the substance or of the attribute or of the action, it leaves the matter where it was, as individuality is peculiarly individualistic and never functions as a unitive principle.³³ Thus, in this way, there is no universal in the case like 'the cook'.

Notion of Negation

(i) *According to Śaṅkarasvāmin, a negation is always understood as negation of this or that (adjuncts, upādhi) of the Jar, of cloth etc. So though negation may not have a universal, but the universal of the object negated will be the cause of the conceptual thought.*³⁴

Objection

But, according to Śāntarakṣita, it cannot be so because the compound "*Vailakṣaṇayātadāshrayāt*" may be constructed to mean either (a) because there is disparity and (b) because it cannot rest upon that.³⁵

In short it means: (a) *abhāva* is distinct from *bhāva* and (b) the universal cannot become a ground for the comprehensive term of *abhāva* (negation).

(ii) *According to Bhāvivikta, it is not held that in every case the notion is exactly in keeping with its cause (or basis), for instance the number 'plurality' subsisting (a) in elephant and horses, or (b) in the dhava and khadira trees, forms the basis of the notion of (a) the 'army' and (b) the 'forest'.³⁶*

Objection

But, according to Śāntarakṣita, if such be the view then why should not the said notion in regard to these diverse things also be held to be based upon the diversity of the body of convention set up by one's own whim (desire).³⁷ In other words it means – 'cow' is called as such because of 'cowness', that is universal is the bases but in that case of 'army', there is no universal as 'armyhood' due to which it is called as such but it is due to the number 'plurality', in this way the ground/source is different in both the cases. Moreover, the function of the words is same i.e. the collective nature but there is subjective imagination (whim/desire) in the latter case and not in the former. If it is there in the latter case then why not in the former case.

(iii) *According to Uddyotakara, as we accept the relation of inherence for the subsistence of universal, in the same way, we accept the relation of qualification and qualified (viśeṣyaviśeṣaṇabhāva) for the subsistence of abhāva.*

Objection

But, according to Śāntarakṣita, such a relation that is the relation of qualification and qualified among entities is always brought about by some other relation. For example, the relation of qualification and qualified between Devadatta and his stick is due to conjunction between them and the same relation between the king and his officer is due to the relation of master and servant. In the case of negation however there is no such other relation, which could form the basis of the relation of qualification and qualified. If such a relation be possible, then there would be an absurdity, every thing could be the qualification of everything.³⁸

(iv) *According to realist, there is one all-embracing universal everywhere.*

Objection

But, according to Śāntarakṣita it is not true, because notions of negation do not appear apart from the six categories. Moreover, we have such notions of negation as (a) in the denial of such things as 'dissociation from Impurities' as apart from the six categories and (b) in the true denial of such imaginary characters in stories like *kapiñjala*

to which adjunct would such notions of 'negation' be due, which could be regarded as their basis? In other words it means - If we accept only one universal being then how can we prove the existence of Imaginary things which doesn't have any universal being and how can we account for the cognition of different objects without postulating particular universal.³⁹ Thus, there is no universal in the case of negation also.

Notion of Imaginary Things, Unborn and Dead Persons

According to Śāntarakṣita, universal cannot subsist in the Imaginary things, because the existence of the individuals is not possible and without the substratum (*ādhāra*, *āśarya*) the subsistent of the universal in Imaginary things is not possible. Hence the fallibility of the opponent's reasons remains as before.⁴⁰ Similarly with regard to past and future things, because the universal is held to be eternal. Thus, there can be no cognition of universal, without its constituent individuals (substratum).⁴¹ If such universal by itself were apprehended then it could not be universal of any particular. In short it means - the particular does good to universal by housing it. If it does not do any good by housing it, then it cannot even manifest it like the Himalayas does not have any relation with the Vindhya mountain, hence the latter cannot be manifested by the former.⁴² Universal can neither be dependent upon the particular by its birth nor can be dependent upon particular for its cognition, since it is

eternal and it is perceived separately.⁴³ There is also no possibility of sense-contact with the substratum having the universal. Because, the Naiyāyika holds the view that *manas* is of atomic dimension, consequently, the cognitive acts take place in succession and not simultaneously. Keeping this in view, when the sense comes in contact with the universal, it cannot have any contact with the substratum of that universal. Consequently this universal could either be apprehended at all times, or not apprehended at any time at all.⁴⁴ Moreover, universal may or may not have the capacity to bring about its own cognition by itself,⁴⁵ which ever way it is, it could not alter it or else it would lose its permanence, this has been thus declared. Its capacity or incapacity which rests in its very nature - who can destroy? As it is eternal and hence not ammenable to treatment.

8. *According to Bhāvivikta, the Universal cow is something distinct from the individual*

Objection

But, according to Śāntarakṣita, this argument may be shown to be fallible (untrue). For instance, even though there is no difference between the universal cook and the individual cook, yet they become the object of diverse cognition's, such as this is a cook that is a cook and so forth. Thus the reason adduced by the other party is found to be inconclusive because it is too wide.⁴⁶

9. *According to realist, universal subsists in several things*

Objection

But, what is this subsistence meant to be? Is it staying? or being manifested?⁴⁷ Staying is also of three kinds, namely - (a) not deviating from its own form, (b) having its down ward movement checked and (c) Inherence.

First is not possible, because being eternal, it can never deviate from its own form. Nor the second, because, being incorporeal and all-pervading it cannot be right to assume the checking of any movement. And, if it held that staying is inherence that cannot be accepted, as it is the exact nature of this inherence that is being examined.⁴⁸

Nor can the subsistence of the universal in the individual be of the nature of being manifested because, manifestation consist only in bringing about its cognition and not in strengthening of its character, because the character of an eternal thing cannot be changed.⁴⁹

Till now, we have discussed Śāntarakṣita criticism against Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika concept of universal now- we will discuss his criticism against Kumārila's arguments, as mentioned in the second chapter, one by one in detail.

Objections to Kumārila's argument

- In the first of these arguments, Kumārila maintain that, in the cognitive process, single bases (universal 'cow') is the cause of the notion of cow in different cows. Whereas according to Śāntarakṣita, common notion of cow in different cows is established no doubt, but the cause or source of such notion is not an universal cow as an external ontological reality. It is shown by us that the notion of cow is due to the exclusion of the non-cow (double negation theory), which is one and which serves to distinguish the cow from all heterogeneous things. Thus, the corroborative instance is devoid of probandum (*sādhya vikalpadoṣaḥ*) because probandum is not established; hence the fact of the notion of the one individual cow being based upon that cannot also be admitted. In this way, Śāntarakṣita criticizes the external ontological status of universal as a single source of the notion of cow in diverse cows and invoke his double negation theory.
- In the argument that the notion of cow cannot be based upon any particular black cow, because, if what is denied is the fact of its being produced directly from it (i.e. the notion of cow comes directly from the cow), then it is superfluous, because the producing is interposed by the apprehension of the specific peculiarity and the conception of convention. That means, there is a problem in the nature of apprehension (i.e. in the manner of

perceiving) and in the convention (i.e. human experience). Thus, the objective support of the universal is falsified, which according to Kumārila is ontological, whereas according to Buddhist, it is constructed at the mental level and supported by convention.

- As for the argument that has been adduced to prove that the universal subsists in its entire form in every individual, there also if the fact is meant to be proved in a vague general way, then it is superfluous. Because in regard to every individual thing, its notion is based upon the notion of the thing as excluded from every other thing, that is, the cause of commonality is *Ekavyāvṛtyā* (similar functioning).
- As regards the statement that 'there is no defect in the source of the notion, that also cannot be admitted, because the defect of the source (i.e. universal 'cow' is always there, in the shape of the beginningless influence of ignorance. Here, 'beginningless' means that the defect is always there in existence, i.e., in our mental functioning but we are unaware/ignorant of this very functioning of the mind. And if we come to know these two factors, then we will lose the ontological belief in the reality of the universal.

Conclusion

In this way, it may be concluded that, 'universal', according to Buddhist, has no real nature. The conception of universal or of things

having 'general essence' is a transcendental illusion originating from the beginningless dispositions of the human mind.⁵⁰ All general cognition, therefore are ultimately illusory. Not only there is nothing universal in the external world but also there is nothing universal in the mental world. All cognition, or ideas as states of mind are particular and momentary.⁵¹ The universal is thus neither an external nor an internal fact. It has no place in the scheme of reality. However, since the universal is commonly believed or judged to be real and forms the basis of our pragmatic activity, it may be regarded as empirically real (*saṃvṛti*). But from the ultimate point of view, it is a mere fiction and fabrication of human mind. Actually, there is a communication gap between realist and Buddhist, realist are talking at ontological level whereas Buddhist are at conceptual or empirical level. Thus, the main points made by the Buddhist in his criticism of the realist doctrine of universals may be summed up as follows:

- (1) The ultimately real is the fleeting momentary particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), which is absolutely discrete and disparate.
- (2) The universal is not an entity belonging to the same order of existence as the particular. It is a category of thought and not a thing. The realist commits the mistake of confusing two different orders of existence.
- (3) Identical cognition does not imply real universal.

- (4) No identity or similarity is given.
- (5) The universal is not a perceived fact.
- (6) All notions of identity are negative they arise by neglecting the mutual difference of particular and by differentiating them from their opposites.

In this way, till now we have discussed the role of universal in knowledge, now we have to discuss its role in language, i.e. in comprehending the meaning of a word and that we may proceed in the next chapter.

Notes and References

1. *asārarp tadidaṃ kāryaṃ prakriyāmātravarṇanam /
na tu taj jñapakam kiñcit pramānam iha vidyate // TS 720*
2. See Dreyfus, p. 143.
3. See Aaron (1967), p. 188.
4. Concept (*kalpanā*) - Dignāga defined *kalpanā* as:
"*kalpanā nāmajātyddiyojanā*"
i.e. *kalpanā* as the association of class-character, quality, action,
substance and name with *sāmānya-lakṣaṇa* or the concept formed.
Dharmakṛti defined *Kalpanā* as:
"*abhilāpha saṃsarga योग्या प्रतियक्षा प्रतिता कल्पना*"
i.e. *kalpanā* as a cognition, the content of which is competent
enough to be associated with verbal expression. This association
takes place when the content and the verbal expression are cognized
in one sweep, so the two are felt to be one inseparable whole. The
word 'competent' is advisedly put into, to include even the
conceptual cognition of children, who has not yet learn the use of
language but whose knowledge reached the state of Judgment and
so would have been actually associated with articulated words.
5. The world of universal is created by the understanding in order to
comprehend the flowing reality. Such creation is natural to
human mind, it is due to the innate constructive tendency
(*anādiavidyā- vāsanā*) common to all human beings. But since the

real by nature is non-relative or non-conceptual, thought and language fail to touch it.

6. See Kochumottam, p. 187.
7. This diagram is illustrated in an article written by Prof. H.S. Prasad (1997) and is used here with his permission.
8. Our pragmatic ends are fulfilled by the particulars and not by universals.
9. One and the same thing cannot be both identical and different, as the two, identity and difference are incompatible.
10. *yatra viṣayavyatiriktanimitta sadbhāvabhavati buddhistal sāmānyam / Yatra tuna bhavati tat svalakṣaṇam II - Vṛtti on Pramāṇavārtika 11.2*
11. See Dreyfus, p. 69.
12. *pratyasattiroinā jātyā yatheṣṭā caksusādiṣu jñāna kāryeṣh jāiroaā yathānvoeti vibhagataḥ - Pramāṇavārtika of Dharmakīrti 11.47.*
13. *yathā dhātryabhayādīnām nānārogaivartane / pratyekaṃ saha vā śaktir nānātve 'pyupalabhyate // TS 722. na teṣu vidhate kiñcit sāmānyam tatra śaktimat / cira kṣiprādibhedena rogasāntyupalambhātaḥ // TS 723 sāmānye 'tiśyaḥ kaścin nahi kṣetrādibhedataḥ / ekarūpatayā nityam dhātryades tu sa vidyate // TS 724 evam atyantabhede 'pi kecin niyatśaktitaḥ / tulyapratyavamarśāder hetuvaṃ yānti nāpare // TS 725*
14. See *Pramāṇa samuccaya*, 1.3
15. See *Nyāya bindu - tīkā*, 1.4

16. See Vasubandhu's "*viññāptimātratā siddhiḥ*", p. 152.
17. *ajalpākāram evādan vijñānaṃ tu prajāyate /
tatas tu samayābhogas tasmāt smārttaṃ tato 'pi te // TS 729*
18. *anyatragatacittasya vastumātropalambhanam /
sarvopādhivivekena tata eva pravarttate // TS 730*
19. See, David Pear's "Universal", pp.218-227.
20. *akṣavyāpdrasadbhāvān na hy anantarabhavinaḥ /
sadādipratyaḥ siddhāḥ saṅketābhogatas tu te // TS 721*
21. *kāryamātropayogitvavivakṣāyāṃ ca sac chruteḥ /
samayaḥ kriyate yeṣu yad vānyasyā yathārūci // Ibid, 725
vāhadohādirūpeṇa kāryabhedopayogini /
gavādiśrutisaṅketaḥ kriyate vyavahartṛbhiḥ // Ibid, 727*
22. *tatsaṅketamanaskārāt sadādipratyaḥ ime /
jāyamānās tu lakṣyante nākṣād vyāpṛty anantaram // Ibid, 728*
23. *kriyāguṇavyapadeśābhāvo hetus ca varṇyate /
abhāvopratyaḥ yeti viśeṣaṇam anarthakam // Ibid., 735
tad apy ayuktaṃ hetutve vastutā śaktito 'pica/
abhāvopratyaḥ praptaḥ sattādiṣv aviśeṣataḥ // Ibid., 736*
24. *anvayī pratyaḥ yasmāc chabdavaktyavabhāsavān /
varṇśakṛtyakṣarā kāraśūnya jatis tu varṇyate // Ibid., 738*
25. *sāmānyasyāpi nīlādir ūpatve guṇato 'sya kaḥ /
bhedo nānugataś caiko nīlādirupalaśyate // Ibid., 739*
26. *padārthaśabdaḥ kaṃ hetum aparam ṣatsvapekṣate /
astīti pratyaḥ yaś ca sattādiṣv anuvartate // Ibid., 743*

27. *pācakādiṣu ca jñānaṃ viśiṣṭarṃ upajāyate /*
abhāve 'bhāvabuddhiś ca vinaikenānugāminā // Ibid., 747
icchāracitarūpeṣu naṣṭājāteṣu vā tataḥ /
anaikāntikatā hetoḥ sarvair ebhir yathoditaiḥ // Ibid., 748
28. *napācakādibuddhinām asti kiñcin nibandhanam /*
karmāsti cetprativyakti na tu tadbhidyate tathā // Ibid., 749
bhinneṣv anvayino 'satve na yuktānvayini matiḥ /
ityekam iṣtam sāmānyarpsarvavyaktyunaṣṛttimat // Ibid., 750
karmānvayadaridarp ca yadi hetuḥ prakalpyate /
tāda vyaktaya evāsyāḥ kimitiṣṭā na hetavaḥ // Ibid., 751.
pācakādīmatir na syāt tatra coporatakriye /
na sadāsannidhānaṃ hi karmeṣṭaṃ jātivat paraiḥ // Ibid., 752
atītānāgatam karma nimittikmrtya teṣu cet /
pācakādiṣu dhīśabdan tan na hetur asattoataḥ // Ibid., 753
29. *kriyātvajātiṣaṃ bandhakriyāyogān matir yadi /*
naṣṭakriye 'pi ca tayā dhruvohetūpalakṣaṇāt // Ibid., 754
30. *na tu naṣṭakriye tatra lakṣitapi na vidyate /*
grhyate vā dhruvā jatiḥ svādhāravini ṛttitaiḥ // Ibid., 755
31. *daṇḍāngadādiyatīnam ekadā na hi lakṣaṇe /*
tad viyoge 'pi daṇḍyādīmatir teṣupravarttate // Ibid., 756
32. *pācanādikriyāyāś ca pradhānaṃ sādhanam matam /*
pācakādīti tac cāsti prādhānyam pācakāntare // Ibid., 761
33. *pradhānyam kirn idaṃ nāma na śaktir asamanvayāt /*
dravyakriyāguṇātmādi nāta evāvakalpyate // Ibid., 762

34. *ghaṭasya prāgabhāva' yaṃ ghaṭapradhvahsa ity ayam /*
tad vastūpādhikān eva dhirabhāvān prapadoyate // Ibid., 766
35. *upādhigatasāmānyavaśād evānuvṛttatā /*
tasyāḥ sarvatra cen naīvam vaikalakṣaṇyāt adāśrayāt // Ibid., 767
36. *na nimittānurūpā cet sarvasmin buddhir iṣyate /*
yatas senādibuddhinām saḥkhyadīṣṭam nibandhanam // Ibid., 770
37. *yady evam iyam eṣṭ eva bhedeṣviṣṭa na kiṃ matih /*
icchāracitasanketabhedābhoganusāriṇī // Ibid., 771
38. *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatvasambandho 'stīti ced iha /*
sambadhāntarasadbhāve nanu cāsaū prakalpyate // Ibid., 782
tayor āsattim āśritya viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyatā /
kalpyate tad abhāve tu sā' nimittā na siddhayati // Ibid., 783
39. *na cānuyāyi teṣṭ iṣṭam anyat sattvamyadīṣyate /*
na ṣafarthātirekeṇa jāyante' bhāvabuddhayaḥ // Ibid., 787
40. *icchāracitar ūpādāv arthe jātir na vidyate /*
vyakter asambhavoād eva sthitā tadvyabhicāratā // Ibid, 788
41. *atītānupajāteṣu nityasāmānyagocaram /*
jñānam cet kevalam nedaṃ sāmānyam gr̥hyate na tu // Ibid., 789
42. *kevalsyopalambhe vā na vyaktīnam idaṃ bhavet /*
sāmānyam na ca tad vyangyam vindhyasyeva himālayaḥ // Ibid., 790
43. *notpattipāratantryeṇa pratibaddham hi tāsvidam /*
na jñānapāratantryarp ca nityatvāt kevala grahāt // Ibid., 791
44. *svāśrayendriyagogādivyapekṣāyā asambhavāt /*
tat sadaivopalabhyeta yadi vā na kadācana // Ibid., 792

45. *svātmani jñānajanane योग्यां वा 'yogyān eva vā /
yadyekadā tādā rūpaṃ sarvadaiva hi tad bhavet // Ibid., 793*
46. *gotaś cārthantaram gotvaṃ bhinnadhīviṣaya tvataḥ /
rūpasparśadivait tasyetyakteś caitraturangavat // Ibid., 795
ity asiman vyabhicāroktiḥ pācakatvādibhis tatha /
anyaā ca diśā' nya 'pi sarvadūṣyah kubetavaḥ // Ibid., 796*
47. *api canekaṃvṛttitvaṃ sāmānyasya yad ueyate /
tatra keyam matā vṛttiḥ sthitiḥ kiṃ vyaktir eva vā // Ibid., 797*
48. *svarūpāpracyutis tāvat sthitiḥ asya svabhāvataḥ /
nādhāras tat kṛtan saktoyena sthāpakatā bhavet // Ibid., 798
gamanapratibandho 'pi na tastye badarādivat /
vidyate niṣkriyatvena nādhāro' taḥ prakalyate // Ibid., 799
sithatis tat samavāyaś cen na tveṣṭ eva vicāryate /
so 'bhiṣ ṭo'yutasiddhānām asnayāśrayitātmakeḥ // Ibid., 800*
49. *svajñānotpattiyogyatve kim abhivyaktikāraṇaiḥ /
svajñānotpattiyayogyatve kim abhivyaktikāraṇaiḥ // Ibid, 802*
50. *tasyāṃ rūpāvabhāsoyamattatvenārthasya va grahah hrbāntiḥ sā
anādikalīna dārśanābhyasā nirmitā - PVV.II.29.*
51. *na hi buddhyā karaḥ sāmānya muktam svalakṣaṇatoāt - PVV.II. 31-32.*
52. *tasyā abhiprāyaśat sāmānyam sat prakīrtitam yayā tayopakal
pitam tadsat paramārthataḥ - PV. 111.69.*